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Research Article 
Marital Dissolution in Japan: 
Recent Trends and Patterns  







Very little is known about recent trends in divorce in Japan.  In this paper, we use 
Japanese vital statistics and census data to describe trends in the experience of marital 
dissolution across the life course, and to examine change over time in educational 
differentials in divorce.  Cumulative probabilities of marital dissolution have increased 
rapidly across successive marriage cohorts over the past twenty years, and synthetic 
period estimates suggest that roughly one-third of Japanese marriages are now likely to 
end in divorce.  Estimates of educational differentials also indicate a rapid increase in 
the extent to which divorce is concentrated at lower levels of education.  While 
educational differentials were negligible in 1980, by 2000, women who had not gone 
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1. Introduction  
Over the past 30-40 years, substantial changes in family behavior and organization of 
the life course have occurred in all industrialized countries.  Often characterized as the 
“second demographic transition,” these changes include: (a) delayed marriage and 
fertility, (b) increasing cohabitation, divorce, and non-marital childbearing, and (c) 
increasing maternal employment (Lesthaeghe 1995; McLanahan 2004).  Theoretical 
explanations for these changes have focused on increasing economic opportunities for 
women, increasing consumption aspirations, declining economic prospects for men, as 
well as increasing secularization and growing emphasis on individual fulfillment 
(Lesthaeghe 1998).  Key empirical features of these family changes include substantial 
socioeconomic and regional variation.  For example, in her recent presidential address 
to the Population Association of America, Sara McLanahan (2004) argued that patterns 
of family change are following two different paths depending on social status.  Changes 
with favorable implications for children (e.g., later marriage, delayed childbearing, 
maternal employment) are increasingly concentrated among women with greater 
socioeconomic resources whereas changes associated with unfavorable outcomes for 
children (e.g., divorce, non-marital childbearing) are increasingly concentrated among 
women with fewer socioeconomic resources.  Family change associated with the second 
demographic transition thus has potentially important implications for social 
stratification in general and for growing socioeconomic differentials in the well-being 
of children in particular.  
Although McLanahan (2004) emphasized the similarity of socioeconomic 
differentials in family behavior across a wide range of western industrialized countries, 
it is also clear that there is considerable variation across countries in the pace and the 
nature of family changes (Lesthaeghe 1995; Lesthaeghe and Moors 2000).  In 
comparative studies, Japan stands out as one setting in which some family changes 
associated with the second demographic transition have been particularly rapid while 
others have been slow to emerge.  A very early transition to below replacement fertility 
and a very late age at marriage place Japan at the forefront of the second demographic 
transition.  At the same time, some family patterns associated with the second 
demographic transition, such as increases in maternal labor force participation and 
divorce have remained less prevalent than in most other low-fertility societies (Tsuya 
and Bumpass 2004).  Despite rapid socioeconomic and normative change, other 
behaviors such as cohabitation and non-marital childbearing have been virtually absent 
(e.g., Thomson 2003) (Note 1).  
The distinctive pattern of family change in Japan likely reflects, in part, a tension 
between the social and economic forces of change noted above and the continued 
strength of family forms and family values very different from those in most western Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 14 
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societies (e.g., Mason, Tsuya, and Choe 1998).  Previous studies of demographic 
change in Japan have linked declining rates of marriage and fertility to relatively 
universal social and economic forces of change including increasing educational 
attainment, increasing economic opportunities for women, increasing consumption 
aspirations, and more tolerant attitudes toward family behaviors such as late marriage 
and maternal employment (Raymo 2003; Retherford, Ogawa, and Matsukura 2001; 
Tsuya and Mason 1995).  Theoretical discussions of the second demographic transition 
often place considerable emphasis on the role of increasing individualistic attitudes.  A 
plausible explanation for the Japanese exception with respect to the most “deviant” 
behaviors is that the growth of individualism is at odds with the collectivist orientation 
of Japanese society (Atoh 2001).  There is, however, some evidence that pressures may 
be building for a transition in cohabitation and perhaps even unmarried childbearing 
(Rindfuss et al., 2005).   
It is also clear that divorce has rapidly increased, with the crude divorce rate 
increasing by two-thirds during the 1990s.  While this change is reflected in pervasive 
attention to divorce in the popular press, demographic analyses of divorce in Japan are 
extremely limited.  Indeed, existing research consists primarily of descriptions of trends 
in crude rates or age trajectories, neither of which speaks directly to the risk of divorce.  
Almost nothing is known about the correlates of divorce in Japan, trends in 
socioeconomic differentials in divorce, or how these differentials compare to those 
observed in other societies.  In this paper, we draw upon several sources of data to 
begin addressing these major gaps in the literature on family change in Japan.  Using 
vital statistics data, we describe divorce trajectories for marriage cohorts and construct 
synthetic cohort estimates to assess the implications of recent rates.  These estimates 
provide a clear picture of the extent to which divorce has increased over time and allow 
for comparisons with other industrialized countries.  Using census data, we examine 
educational differentials in the prevalence of divorce and describe how these 
differentials have changed over time.  Results of these analyses enable us to assess the 
extent to which the increasing socioeconomic differentials in divorce found in other 
low-fertility societies (McLanahan 2004) are also observed in Japan.  Our results raise 
several questions regarding the implications of rising divorce rates for social 
stratification and the well-being of children and divorced parents in Japan.  Importantly, 
this study also provides a solid empirical basis for subsequent research addressing these 
questions we raise.  Before presenting our results, we provide a brief background on 
family change in Japan and existing scholarship on divorce.  
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2. Background  
Following steady increases throughout the 1990s, Japan’s crude divorce rate reached 
2.3 in 2002 (Figure 1).  It is extremely important to recognize that, as illustrated at the 
right side of this figure, this is a level similar to most industrialized countries other than 
the U.S.  The Japanese rate is also much higher than in Italy and Spain, two European 
countries with which Japan shares many other demographic similarities (Lesthaeghe 
and Moors 2000).  As in the U.S., rapid increases in divorce suggest a major 
restructuring of the family life course in Japan.  It will be important in future research to 
compare the consequences of divorce for women and children in Japan to those in other 
industrialized countries.  The prevalence of extended family residence (Rindfuss et al. 
2004) and the importance of family provided care (Ogawa and Retherford 1997) could 
moderate these consequences, while the highly asymmetric gender division of labor 
among spouses (Tsuya and Mason 1995) and married women’s relatively tenuous 
attachment to the labor force (Brinton 2001; Iwasawa 1999) could make the 
consequences of divorce even more profound for women and families in Japan than in 
other high-divorce societies.  The social, economic, and family environments in which 
divorce occurs in Japan provide a valuable contrast to the U.S. and other western 
countries for studying the correlates and consequences of divorce.   
As a non-western society with a very different family tradition, Japan provides an 
important test of the generality of McLanahan’s (2004) description of growing 
socioeconomic differentials in family outcomes (Note 2).  Do relatively low levels of 
economic inequality and widely shared normative views of “appropriate” family 
behavior restrain such divergence in the experience and consequences of divorce?  On 
the one hand, the homogeneity of the family life course in Japan’s recent past (Brinton 
1992) leads us to expect rather limited socioeconomic differentials in divorce.  These 
expectations are strengthened by the fact that fertility reduction in the 1950s and more 
recent trends toward later and less marriage have occurred rapidly across all social 
strata (Hodge and Ogawa 1992; Raymo 2003).  On the other hand, we have recently 
documented growing socioeconomic differentials in the experience of bridal pregnancy, 
an increasingly common pathway to family formation (Raymo and Iwasawa 2004).  It is 
clear that Japanese women with lower levels of education are increasingly likely to 
marry while pregnant relative to their more educated counterparts.  Finding a similar 
pattern with respect to divorce would provide further evidence of decline in the very 
homogeneous family life course in Japan.  Although the subject of increasing 
socioeconomic inequality has been much discussed in Japan during recent years (Satō 
2000; Tachibanaki 2001), very little attention has been paid to the potential role of 
growing differentials in family behavior.  Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 14 
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Indeed, there is very little academic research on divorce at all.  Existing work is 
limited to descriptions of trends in crude rates by age and sex (e.g., Koyama and 
Yamamoto 2001), analyses of regional variation in crude rates (Fukurai and Alston 
1990; Uchida, Araki, and Murata 1993), and synthetic cohort analyses based on age-
specific divorce rates--which ignore differences in marriage duration by age (Beppu 
2002, Ikenoue and Takahashi 1994).  The scarcity of research on divorce in Japan 
presumably reflects the limitations of available data.  Complete marriage histories like 
those commonly analyzed for the U.S. and Western Europe are not available in Japan 
(Note 3).  This does not mean, however, that we cannot learn more from the existing 
data. 
We have three objectives in this paper.  The first is to track the experiences over 
time of real marriage cohorts up until the duration when they can last be observed.   The 
second is to use the most recently available period data to make synthetic cohort 
estimates of the cumulative proportion of marriages expected to end in divorce by 
various durations since marriage.  These two results are presented and discussed 
together.  Finally, we take the observed proportions divorced by ages 35-39 as reported 
in the census and make adjustments for differential age at marriage by education 
(affecting differences in duration since marriage at the observed ages) in order to 
approximate educational differences in the risk of divorce. 
 
 
3. Data and methods  
3.1 Data  
The basic data for estimating duration-specific risks are simply the number of marriages 
and divorces registered in the Japanese vital statistics system across years.  Data on 
marital dissolutions classified by the years in which marriage began and ended come 
from special tabulations not included in the annual volumes published by the Ministry 
of Health, Labour, and Welfare.  We adjust these data as described below to reassign 
events from their year of registration to the year in which they actually occurred.  The 
data for estimating educational differentials are census reports of the percent of ever-
married women divorced at ages 35-39, combined with estimates of educational 
differences in duration since marriage by these ages. 
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3.2 Adjustment for year of registration  
The divorce tabulations classify all divorces registered in a given year (between 1979 
and 2002) by the year in which the marriage began and the year in which the marriage 
ended.  Because roughly 10% of marriages and 30% of divorces are not registered in 
the year in which they occur (Ishikawa 1995), it is essential to measure marital duration 
using the years in which the union began and ended rather than the years in which 
marriage and divorce were registered.  The vital statistics tabulations we use allow us to 
calculate the number of marital dissolutions by marriage cohort and marital duration by 
summing registered divorces in each year occurring to each marriage cohort—as 
measured by the years in which coresidence began and ended.   
Because the earliest marriage cohort in the data is 1979 and the most recent year of 
data is 2002, we can observe divorces registered up to twenty-three years after they 
occurred (Note 4).  Our counts become progressively less complete for the more recent 
years because for each succeeding year a higher proportion of the events will not yet 
have been registered.  To construct yearly counts of divorce classified by year of 
marriage, we use the procedure described in Figure 2.  We first subtract from each 
year's registered divorces those that occurred in earlier years and add them to the 
number events for the year in which they occurred (which have, in turn, had late 
registrations subtracted from them and reassigned to earlier years).  The count of the 
number events for year t is simply the number of events registered in year t, minus 
those that occurred n years earlier, and plus those that were registered n years after year 
t (where n ranges from 1 to 23).  These additions and subtractions of divorces registered 
with delay are represented by the bold dashed arrows in Figure 2.  This creates a good 
count of annual events until the more recent years for which we no longer observe the 
large majority of late registrations.  However, we can take advantage of the fact that 
patterns of delayed registration have been remarkably stable over time to estimate the 
number of divorces that have occurred by 2002 but will be registered in 2003 and 
beyond.   
Using the years for which we have complete counts of events and the years in 
which these events were registered, we can estimate the proportion of the events 
occurring in a particular year, but that will not yet have been registered by 2002.  For 
example, to estimate a complete count of marital dissolutions occurring in 1999, we 
first add in the late registrations of 1999 divorces as recorded in 2000-2002, and then 
adjust that total for the proportion of all divorces from earlier years that were registered 
more than three years after they occurred (Note 5).  The addition of these estimated 
numbers of divorces occurring by 2002 but registered after 2002 is represented by the 
thin dotted arrows in Figure 2.  To assess the appropriateness of this procedure, we also 
worked backwards to estimate the number of duration-specific divorces registered with Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 14 
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a given delay in the past.  In all cases, these estimates were very close to the observed 
values.  
We use similar techniques to construct yearly marriage cohorts.  Vital statistics 
tabulations classify all marriages registered in a given year by the year in which the 
marriage actually occurred.  As with the divorce data, we are thus able to reconstruct 
annual marriage cohorts by allocating late-registered marriages from the year in which 
they were registered back to the year in which they occurred (Note 6).  We adjust the 
size of marriage cohorts upward by estimating marriages that have already occurred but 
have not yet been registered using the procedure described in the previous paragraph.  
With yearly counts of marriages and duration-specific numbers of marital dissolutions 
for each marriage cohort, it is straightforward to calculate the cumulative duration-
specific proportions of each marriage cohort to experience marital dissolution.   
Rearranging cohort and duration-specific dissolution probabilities as year and duration-
specific dissolution probabilities allows us to calculate the synthetic cohort cumulative 
probability of marital dissolution for recent years.  Because the earliest marriage cohort 
in our data is 1979, we can use observed dissolution probabilities in 2002 to calculate a 
synthetic cohort divorce trajectory through 23 years of marriage.  For the sake of 
simplicity, we ignore mortality in these life-table calculations.  This simplification is 
unlikely to affect results given the very low levels of young adult and mid-life mortality 
in Japan.   
 
 
3.3 The cumulative risk of divorce  
We begin by creating synthetic life-table estimates of cumulative divorce by duration of 
marriage.  There are several important issues relating to these estimates.  The first is 
that we use divorce data from 2002.  It is important to use the most recently available 
data given that the crude divorce rate increased so dramatically during the 1990s—a 
decade characterized by very low levels of economic growth, corporate restructuring, 
and increasing unemployment (Yamagami 2002).   
Second, we improve considerably upon existing synthetic estimates by estimating 
cumulative disruption from entry into exposure to risk (marriage) rather than by age, 
i.e., we use marital duration-specific dissolution rates rather than age-specific rates.  
Age-specific divorce rates reflect two components: a) the risk of divorce by duration 
since marriage, and b) the effects of age at marriage on the proportions married at 
specific ages, and age differences in duration since marriage.  Cumulative estimates 
based on age are appropriate when the objective is compare life course experience by a 
given age—for example, differences between cohorts in the experience of divorce 
before age 30.  To evaluate the risk of divorce, however, estimates must be based on Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 14 
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rates specific to durations since marriage.  This difference between age-based and 
duration-based estimates is especially important in settings such as contemporary Japan 
where marriage timing has changed rapidly (Raymo 2003).   
Finally, we present data for both real and synthetic cohorts.  We are not aware of 
any previous analyses of marital dissolution in Japan describing the trajectories of real 
marriage cohorts.   
 
 
3.4 Differences by education  
Registration forms for vital statistics do not collect information on educational 
attainment, and large sample surveys such as the Current Population Survey or the 
National Survey of Families and Households which collect respondents’ socioeconomic 
characteristics and marital histories are not currently available in Japan (see Note 3).   
Rather than waiting for such data to become available, we believe that it is 
important to take advantage of existing data to learn what we can.  Consequently, we 
use data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 census publications to describe educational 
differences in current marital status and to examine how these differentials have 
changed over time.  It is important to recognize, however, that examining differentials 
in current marital status to shed light on educational differentials in divorce poses two 
significant problems.  The first is that current marital status understates the actual 
amount of divorce because those who have divorced and remarried are simply classified 
as married (Note 7).  We are thus forced to assume that there are no educational 
differentials in the likelihood of remarriage.  Growing educational differentials in the 
transition to first marriage in Japan (Raymo 2003) suggest that this assumption may be 
violated.  However, the fact that studies of remarriage in the U.S. and other 
industrialized societies have typically not found significant educational differentials in 
remarriage (de Graaf and Kalmijn 2003), suggests that the same may be true in Japan.  
Data from the Japanese National Fertility Surveys (JNFS), the only large survey 
containing information on both educational attainment and experience of divorce, 
suggest that educational differentials in remarriage are not large in Japan.  However, 
because the number of ever-divorced respondents is small for some educational groups, 
we cannot confidently conclude from these data that educational differentials in 
remarriage are negligible.  This caveat should be kept in mind when evaluating our 
results.   
The second problem is the one we addressed above in comparing life-table 
estimates based on duration since marriage rather than simply on age.  The available 
census data leave us no option but to base our estimate on comparisons of the 
proportion divorced at specific ages.  Because those in lower educational groups marry Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 14 
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at younger ages, on average, than those in higher educational groups (Raymo 2003), the 
length of exposure to divorce is inversely related to educational attainment.  We take a 
simple approach to addressing this problem.  We first calculate age-specific mean ages 
at marriage by education, and we then weight the education-specific ever married 
populations by the number of years between mean age at first marriage and the census 
date.  Dividing the divorced populations by these measures adjusts the prevalence of 
divorce to reflect educational differences in age of initial exposure to the risk of 
divorce.  For each educational group at each census, we are thus able to calculate the 
number of currently divorced individuals for each year between initial exposure to the 
risk of divorce and the census date. 
In order to calculate the education-specific values of mean age at marriage used to 
weight the ever married populations in the census tabulations, we use data from the 
Japanese National Fertility Surveys.  Conducted every five years by the National 
Institute of Population and Social Security Research, these surveys provide information 
on educational attainment and age at marriage for large nationally representative 
samples of married women between the ages of 18 and 49.  Measures of mean age at 
marriage for 1980 are calculated from the 1982 JNFS, values for 1990 are calculated 
from pooled data from the 1987 and 1992 JNFS, and values for 2000 come from the 
1997 JNFS.  Because tabulations of marital status by educational attainment in the 
census are presented by five-year age group, we calculate mean age at marriage for 
similar age groups in each of the JNF surveys.  In the analyses presented below, we 
focus on ages 35-39 because women at these ages will have been married long enough 
for many divorces to occur, and yet their experience represents marriages over a 
relatively recent period.   
We present these analyses and their results in two sections.  In the first, we 
examine trends and levels in marital dissolution and in the second, we examine 




4.1 Trends and levels  
We describe trends in marital dissolution by examining the cumulative probability of 
divorce for single-year marriage cohorts beginning in 1980, and a synthetic cohort 
trajectory based on divorce rates observed in 2002.  The latter spells out the 
implications of recent increases in divorce by describing the expected cumulative 
proportion divorced at successive durations if a marriage cohort were to follow the most 
recently observed duration-specific rates.   Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 14 
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Figure 3 presents five cumulative divorce trajectories.  The four solid lines 
represent the experience of the 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995 marriage cohorts.  The 
broken line represents the synthetic cohort dissolution trajectory calculated from 
duration-specific dissolution probabilities observed in 2002.  The rapid increase in 
marital dissolution is very clear, particularly between the 1985 and 1990 marriage 
cohorts.  The proportion of marriages ending within five years is 50% higher for the 
1995 marriage cohort (12%) than for the 1980 marriage cohort (8%).  The proportion of 
marriages dissolved within 10 years was 12% for marriages begun in 1980 and 17% for 
marriages begun in 1990.  Despite the somewhat greater gap between marriages begun 
in 1985 and 1990, each successive cohort has experienced a higher proportion divorced 
at each duration since marriage.  The synthetic cohort line continues this pattern with an 
increase over the 1995 cohort and then follows a smooth trajectory in which the 
proportion divorced by 12 years is about as much higher than the 1990 cohort as the 
1990 cohort was relative to the 1985 cohort.  This rough equivalence of a 10 year 
increase (between 2000 and 1990) to the prior 5 year change (between 1990 and 1985) 
suggests some attenuation in the rate of increase, but implies continuing increases in 
divorce nonetheless.  We estimate the cumulative probability of marital dissolution 
within 20 years of marriage to be 30%, a figure that is substantially higher than the 
lifetime probability of divorce from earlier age-based estimates (Beppu 2002; Ikenoue 
and Takahashi 1994).   
As we argued in the introduction, Japan’s markedly different family traditions 
make comparisons with the Western experience of the second demographic transition 
extremely valuable.  Figure 4 compares the proportion of marriages expected to end in 
divorce by 20 years after marriage in Japan to those estimated for various European 
countries by Andersson and Philipov (2001).  Our results here are startling.  While the 
increase in rates of divorce in Japan is well recognized, it has gone unnoticed that Japan 
has fully experienced this component of the “second demographic transition.”  The risk 
of divorce for new marriages in Japan now matches the highest levels in Europe, even 
though it is still considerably below that in the U.S.  Rates are similar to those of 
Germany and Austria, slightly higher than those in Sweden and Finland, and 
substantially higher than those of France (30 vs. 19 percent) (Note 8).   
Although divorce rates decline steadily over the course of marriage, there is some 
increase in cumulative divorce for a cohort even after the duration of 23 years that we 
can estimate from our data.  On the other hand, the cumulative proportion divorced 
increases very little after 30 years, so the proportion divorced by 30 years is a 
reasonable indicator of the lifetime probability of divorce.  We can make a rough 
estimate of this proportion, by applying the ratio of the proportion divorced by 30 years 
to the proportion divorced by 20 years duration as reported in other synthetic cohort 
studies of divorce in the U.S. and elsewhere.  The lowest of these ratios (from the U.S) Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 14 
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suggests that a third of all marriages in Japan will end in divorce by 30 years after 
marriage.  This has very substantial implications for family patterns in Japan, especially 
in light of evidence presented in the next section showing that the prevalence of divorce 
is relatively high among the less advantaged.  
 
 
4.2 Educational differentials   
It is extremely important to understand the extent to which this rapid increase in marital 
dissolution has occurred across the socioeconomic spectrum or is increasingly 
concentrated among certain groups.  As noted above, cross-national studies of family 
change associated with the second demographic transition indicate that divorce is 
increasingly concentrated among the less educated (McLanahan 2004).  We would 
expect to observe a similar pattern of change in Japan to the extent that economic 
hardship is associated with marital instability and to the extent that Japanese couples 
with more limited socioeconomic resources have been most adversely affected by the 
economic downturn of the 1990s. 
We begin with tabulations of age and marital status by educational attainment for 
women in the 1980, 1990, and 2000 census publications.  The census contains six 
categories of educational attainment: junior high school graduates, high school 
graduates, junior college/vocational school graduates, university graduates, in school, 
and never attended school.  We do not consider the last two categories given the very 
small numbers in each and the largely irrelevant nature of the “in school” category 
beyond usual ages for schooling.  In Figure 5, we present the unadjusted ratios of the 
divorced population to the ever married population by educational attainment for 35-39 
year old women in 1980, 1990, and 2000.  It is immediately clear that the prevalence of 
divorce has increased for all educational groups, especially between 1990 and 2000 
(Note 9).  In 1980, less than 5% of ever married 35-39 year-old women were currently 
divorced.  By 2000, 15% of ever married women who did not finish high school and 
7% of high school graduates were divorced.  Increases in the prevalence of divorce for 
women with at least a two-year college degree have been relatively small.  While it is 
important to keep in mind that these figures substantially understate experience of 
divorce given that roughly half of those who divorce eventually remarry, it seems clear 
that there has been a sharp increase in educational differentials in divorce over the past 
two decades.   
In Figure 6, we describe change over time in the relative prevalence of divorce 
after adjusting for educational differences in the mean age at first marriage of 35-39 
year old women at each census (as calculated from the Japanese National Fertility 
Surveys).  This adjustment to account for earlier marriage among women in lower Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 14 
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educational groups has little impact on the patterns described by the unadjusted data.  
Educational differences in the prevalence of divorce were negligible in 1980 but 
increased substantially over the following two decades.  In 1990, there was a slight 
divergence between women with higher education and those who completed high 
school and a very large relative increase in the prevalence of divorce among women 
who did not finish high school.  This divergence between women with and without 
higher education accelerated rapidly between 1990 and 2000.  In the 2000 census, the 
adjusted prevalence of divorced female high school graduates is 1.6 times larger than 
for university graduates.  Among women who did not complete high school, the 
prevalence of divorce is 2.8 times higher than among college graduates.  Trends for 
women in the lowest educational category may be discounted given the increasingly 
small and select nature of this group – in the 2000 census, only 5% of 35-39 year-old 
women were classified as junior high school graduates.  However, with high school 
graduates comprising 51% of 35-39 year-old women in 2000, it is clear that there are 
growing educational differentials in the experience of divorce in Japan.   
There are two issues that could possibly result in the size of these differentials 
being overstated.  First, because age at first marriage has increased substantially 
between 1980 and 2000, age at divorce has also increased, thus inflating the prevalence 
of divorce (i.e., women have had less time to remarry).  If this pattern of change has 
differed by education, our results may overstate the increase in educational differentials 
in divorce.  This seems most unlikely, however, since age at first marriage has been 
delayed most among the most highly educated women (Raymo 2003).  Second, it is 
possible that educational differentials in the likelihood of remarriage following divorce 
have increased.  If highly educated women are increasingly likely to remarry soon after 
divorce (relative to their less educated counterparts), the patterns depicted in Figure 6 
would overstate the increase in educational differentials in divorce.  We are not aware, 
however, of any empirical or anecdotal evidence to suggest that this is the case.   
In sum, our adjustment for differences in age at first marriage only partially 
accounts for differences in exposure to the risk of divorce so we do not place much 
weight on the specific values presented in Figure 6.  Rather, it is the general pattern of 
change that is important.  The very clear trends convince us that the growing 
educational differentials in divorce are not an artifact of the crude measurement 
techniques necessitated by data limitations.  The ratio of divorced high school graduates 
to divorced university graduates may be more or less than the 1.6 we calculate but it is 
surely larger than it was in 1980 and 1990.   
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5. Discussion 
Very little has been known about recent trends in marital dissolution in Japan.  It is 
clear that crude divorce rates increased sharply during the 1990s, but the absence of 
more informative measures of the likelihood of divorce has hidden the scale of current 
levels.  Furthermore, nothing was known about socioeconomic differentials in divorce.  
Our interest in understanding patterns of divorce in Japan is heightened by the contrast 
between the very homogeneous nature of the family life course in Japan and evidence 
of increasing socioeconomic differentials in family behavior in other industrialized 
societies.  Is divorce increasingly common across socioeconomic strata, as suggested by 
the limited socioeconomic differentials in fertility trends and changes in marriage 
timing?  Is divorce increasingly concentrated among those with fewer socioeconomic 
resources, as in other industrialized countries?  In this paper, we have utilized available 
data to describe trends in the experience of marital dissolution across the life course and 
to examine trends in educational differentials in the prevalence of divorce.   
Cumulative probabilities of divorce have increased markedly across marriage 
cohorts in Japan.  Indeed, our synthetic cohort estimates indicate that roughly one-third 
of Japanese marriages are expected to end in divorce.  This figure is similar to that 
observed in some western European countries and higher than the level in most.  Japan 
is no longer a society characterized by low levels of marital dissolution.  Rough 
estimates of educational differentials in the prevalence of divorce indicate that there has 
been a rapid increase over the past two decades in the extent to which divorce is 
concentrated among those with lower levels of education.  While educational 
differentials in the prevalence of divorce were negligible in the 1980 census, women 
with a high school degree or less are far more likely than their more highly educated 
counterparts to be divorced in the 2000 census.   
As in the U.S. and most other industrialized societies, it appears that family 
changes associated with the second demographic transition may have important 
implications for social stratification in Japan.  For example, the economic implications 
of rising divorce rates for women may be particularly pronounced in Japan where 
married women’s attachment to the labor force is far more tenuous than in the U.S. and 
many European countries.  At the same time, however, the relatively high prevalence of 
coresidence with parents following divorce may diminish the economic implications of 
divorce for some Japanese women and their children (Note 10).  Tabulations of 
Japanese census data and data from the National Survey of Families and Households 
indicate that the proportion of 35-39 year-old divorced women coresiding with parents 
is 25% in Japan but only 2% in the U.S.  Does this pattern of post-divorce coresidence 
with parents mitigate the economic consequences of divorce for women?  Does it 
influence the likelihood of remarriage among divorced women?  Does it ameliorate the Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 14 
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negative consequences for children of growing up with a single parent (e.g., 
McLanahan and Sandefur 1994)?  In considering these questions, attention will need to 
be paid to the potential for even further divergence in family experience.  If coresidence 
ameliorates the consequences of divorce for some women and children in Japan, these 
consequences may be very severe indeed for the majority who do not live with parents.  
In the absence of joint custody laws, what role do divorced fathers play in the lives of 
their children?  What are the implications of divorce for father’s well-being?   
Subsequent research should address these questions not only to further understand the 
family implications of divorce in Japan but also to further understand the ways in which 
the consequences of divorce may be moderated by the family, legal, and economic 
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Notes 
1.   Japan’s total fertility rate has been below 2.1 since 1974.  In 2002, the mean age at 
marriage was 27.4 for women and 29.1 for men, 1.9% of children were born to 
unmarried mothers, and 3% of unmarried 25-29 year old men and women were in 
cohabiting unions (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 
2004a, 2004b). 
2.   It is worth noting that low levels of divorce are not a “traditional” feature of the 
Japanese family.  Historical studies (Fuess 2004; Hayami 1973) have documented 
very high levels of divorce among Japanese couples in the 19
th century.  
3.   Marital history data are available from the National Family Research of Japan 
survey conducted by the Japan Society for Family Sociology and from the Japanese 
General Social Survey, but both surveys seriously underrepresent divorced 
respondents. 
4.   Vital statistics data obviously provide no information on marriages that were 
dissolved but never officially ended by registration of divorce.  If “de facto” 
divorces are common in Japan, as in the U.S. (Bumpass, Castro Martin, and Sweet 
1991), the vital statistics data will understate the incidence of divorce.   
Furthermore, if there are socioeconomic differentials in the likelihood of either 
registering divorce or self-report of divorce in the census, our analyses may 
understate or overstate educational differentials in the experience of divorce. 
5.   This adjustment procedure very closely resembles that described in Ishikawa 
(1995). 
6.   We use data on all divorces and marriages.  We do not distinguish between first 
marriages and remarriages.  Among women, first marriages comprised 91% of all 
marriages in 1979 and 85% of all marriages in 2002 (National Institute of 
Population and Social Security Research 2004a).  
7.   Tabulations of current marital status by experience of divorce among respondents 
to the Japanese National Fertility Surveys suggest that roughly 40% of divorced 
women and 60% of divorced men remarry. 
8.   The figures from Andersson and Philipov (2001) are based on data from the late 
1980s and early 1990s.   
9.   The patterns described here are very similar for women in adjacent five-year age-
groups. Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 14 
410 http://www.demographic-research.org 
10.  Mothers receive custody in roughly 80% of divorces involving children (National 
Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2004a). Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 14 
http://www.demographic-research.org 411 
References 
Andersson, Gunnar and Dimiter Philipov. (2001). "Life-Table Representations of 
Family Dynamics in 16 FFS Countries." MPIDR Working Paper Series WP 
2001-024, Rostock, Germany: Max-Planck Institute for Demographic Research. 
Atoh, Makoto. (2001). "Very Low Fertility in Japan and Value Change Hypotheses." 
Review of Population and Social Security Policy 10:1-21. 
Beppu, Motomi. (2002). "An Analysis of the Marriage Life Cycle in Japan Using 
Multistate Life Tables: 1930, 1955, 1975, and 1995." Journal of Population 
Studies 30:23-40. (in Japanese) 
Brinton, Mary C. (1992). "Christmas Cakes and Wedding Cakes: The Social 
Organization of Japanese Women's Life Course." In Takie S. Lebra, editor. 
Japanese Social Organization. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press: 79-
107. 
Brinton, Mary C. (2001). “Married Women's Labor in East Asian Economies.” In Mary 
C.Brinton, editor. Women's Working Lives in East Asia. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press: 1-37. 
Bumpass, Larry L., Martin Teresa Castro, and James A. Sweet. (1991). "The Impact of  
Family Background and Eary Marital Factors on Marital Disruption." Journal of 
Family Issues 12:22-42. 
de Graaf, Paul M. and Matthijs Kalmijn. (2003). "Alternative Routes in the Remarriage 
Market: Competing-Risk Analyses of Union Formation After Divorce." Social 
Forces 81:1459-1498. 
Fuess, Harald. (2004). Divorce in Japan: Family, Gender, and the State 1600-2000. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Fukurai, Hiroshi and Jon Alston. (1990). "Divorce in Contemporary Japan." Journal of 
Biosocial Science 22:453-464. 
Hayami, Akira. (1973). Historical Demographic Analysis of Rural Japan in Modern 
Times. Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shimpōsha. (in Japanese) 
Hodge, Robert W. and Naohiro Ogawa. (1991). Fertility Change in Contemporary 
Japan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Ikenoue, Masako and Shigesato Takahashi. (1994). “Multistate Marriage Life Tables.” 
Journal of Population Problems 50(2):73-96. (in Japanese) Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 14 
412 http://www.demographic-research.org 
Ishikawa, Akira. (1995). “Statistical Comparison between Legal and Common-Law 
Marriage in Japan.” Journal of Population Problems 50(4):45-56. (in Japanese) 
Iwasawa, Miho. (1999). “The Sate of Women’s Life Course in Contemporary Japan: 
Focusing on Never-Married Women’s Prospects.”  Journal of Population 
Problems 55(4):16-37. (in Japanese) 
Koyama, Yasuyo and Chizuko Yamamoto. (2001). “Trends in Japanese Marriage and 
Divorce: 1996-1998.”  Journal of Population Problems 57(3):53-76. (in 
Japanese) 
Lesthaeghe, Ron. (1998). "On Theory Development and Applications to the Study of 
Family Formation." Population and Development Review 24:1-14. 
Lesthaeghe, Ron. (1995). "The Second Demographic Transition—An Interpretation." In 
Karen O. Mason and Jensen An-Magrit, editors. Gender and Family Change in 
Industrial Countries. Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press: 17-62. 
Lesthaeghe, Ron and Guy Moors. (2000). "Recent Trends in Fertility and Household 
Formation in the Industrialized World." Review of Population and Social Policy 
9:121-170. 
Mason, Karen O., Noriko O. Tsuya, and Minja K. Choe. (1998). "Introduction." In 
Karen O. Mason and Minja K. Choe, editors. The Changing Family in 
Comparative Perspective: Asia and the United States. Honolulu, HI: University 
of Hawaii Press: 1-16. 
McLanahan, Sara. (2004). " Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the 
Second Demographic Transition." Demography 41:607-627. 
McLanahan, Sara and Gary Sandefur. (1994). Growing up with a Single Parent: What 
Hurts, What Helps. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. (2004a). Latest 
Demographic Statistics. Tokyo: National Institute of Population and Social 
Security Research. (in Japanese) 
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. (2004b). Attitudes 
toward Marriage and the Family among the Unmarried Japanese Youth - The 
Twelfth National Fertility Survey. Tokyo: National Institute of Population and 
Social Security Research. (in Japanese) 
Raymo, James M. (2003). "Educational Attainment and the Transition to First Marriage 
Among Japanese Women." Demography 40:83-103. Demographic Research – Volume 11, Article 14 
http://www.demographic-research.org 413 
Raymo, James M. and Miho Iwasawa. (2004). “Premarital Pregnancy and Spouse 
Pairing Patterns in Japan: Assessing How Novel Family Behaviors “Fit in” to 
the Family Formation Process.” Annual Meeting of the Population Association 
of America, Boston, MA (April 1-3). 
Retherford, Robert D., Naohiro Ogawa, and Rikiya Matsukura. (2001). "Late Marriage 
and Less Marriage in Japan." Population and Development Review 27:65-102. 
Rindfuss, Ronald R.; Minja Kim Choe, Larry L. Bumpass, and Yong-Chan Byun. 
(2004).  “Intergenerational Relations.” In Noriko O. Tsuya and Larry L. 
Bumpass, editors. Marrriage, Work, and Family Life in Comparative 
Perspective: Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Honolulu, HI: East-
West Center: 54-75.  
Rindfuss, Ronald R., Minja Kim Choe, Larry Bumpass, and Noriko Tsuya. (2005). 
“Social Networks and Family Change in Japan.” American Sociological Review 
(Forthcoming). 
Satō, Toshiki. (2000). Unequal Japan. Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha. (in Japanese) 
Tachibanaki, Toshiaki. (2001). Economic Inequality in Japan. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. 
(in Japanese) 
Thomson, Elizabeth. (2003). “Partnerships & Parenthood: A Comparative View of 
Cohabitation, Marriage and Childbearing.” Presented at the eleventh annual 
National Symposium on Family Issues, The Pennsylvania State University, 
College Park, PA (October).  
Tsuya, Noriko O. and Larry L. Bumpass. (2004). “Introduction.” In Noriko O. Tsuya 
and Larry L. Bumpass, editors. Marrriage, Work, and Family Life in 
Comparative Perspective: Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Honolulu, 
HI: East-West Center: 1-18. 
Tsuya, Noriko O. and Karen O. Mason. (1995). "Changing Gender Roles and Below 
Replacement Fertility in Japan." In Karen O. Mason and An-Magrit Jensen, 
editors. Gender and Family Change in Industrialized Countries. Oxford, U.K.: 
Clarendon Press: Pp. 139-167. 
Uchida, Eiichi, Shunichi Araki, and Katsuyuki Murata. (1993). "Socioeconomic Factors 
Affecting Marriage, Divorce, and Birth Rates in a Japanese Population." Journal 
of Biosocial Science 25:499-507. 
Yamagami, Toshihiko. (2002). “Utilization of Labor Resources in Japan and the United 


































































































































Figure 1:   Trends in Japan’s Crude Divorce Rate and Recent Figures from Other 
Countries. 
 
Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. 2004. Latest Demographic Statistics. Tokyo: National Institute 
of Population and Social Security Research. 









Figure 2:   Adjustment Procedure Used to Construct Yearly Divorce Counts. 
 
Note: t=1979-2002, n=1-23.  All divorces are classified by the year in which the marriage began and ended. 
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Figure 4:   Proportion of Marriages Expected to Disrupt Within 20 Years: Life Table 
Estimates. 
 
Source: Andersson and Philipov (2001). 
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Figure 5:    Ratio of Divorced to Ever Married 35-39 Year Old Women, by 
Educational Attainment: 1980, 1990, 2000. 
 
Source: Population Census of Japan, 1980, 1990, 2000. 
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Figure 6:   Educational Differences in the Prevalence of Divorce: Adjusted Ratio of 
Divorced to Ever Married 35-39 Year Old Women Relative to University 
Graduates, 1980, 1990, 2000. 
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